Strategic Selection Review

Having read several other critically-acclaimed studies on presidential nominations to the Court, I wasn't sure what her book would offer that might be new.  However, she has successfully found an area in the nomination process that there has been, to date, little to no research in.  Dr. Nemacheck researched all the papers of the Presidents available (this excludes Clinton and George W. Bush), to determine who the presidents' consulted with, and to determine whose names were on the short lists (if there were any).  She developed hypotheses in several broad areas and then tested them statistically to see if they were actually significant.

She first looked at the influence Congress had on the development of the short list.  There were three broad areas of research:  institutional factors, member characteristics, and presidential political capital.  Using these three areas, she proposed 11 hypotheses to test.  Her conclusions are that there is some evidence that "presidents act strategically in incorporating, or listening to, endorsements made by some members of Congress" in the development of the short list.  By this, she means that if the president is facing a Senate controlled by the opposition party, he will be more likely to consider a suggested nominee than he might otherwise likely consider when his own party controls the Senate.

She next looks at how a nominee is actually chosen from the short list.  What factors play a role in this choice?  Specifically, for her study, she wants to look at generalizations as opposed to individual characteristics of the president making the selection.  Here she looks at the increasing institutionalization of the presidency, the growth of the executive branch, and changes in the Senate's institutional norms in the confirmation process.  Under these areas, she develops seven hypotheses which are again tested statistically.  Her conclusions are that although a president's individuality and style play an important role, the changes in the institutions do, in fact, affect the selection process to a significant degree.  The main effect seems to be that increased institutionalization has caused the selection process to become more centralized.  In this, it appears that as time has gone on, presidents are more likely to rely on their White House advisors and less on, say, the Department of Justice (with the possible exception of the Attorney General).

The last area Dr. Nemacheck examines is the actual final choice.  In this, she looks at two areas, informational and political selection strategies.  The information strategy deals with what information is available about the potential nominees.  Here, she derives four hypotheses:

"Informational hypothesis 1:  Presidents are likely to select more ideologically compatible     nominees when they are under fewer political constraints.

Informational hypothesis 2:  Presidents are more likely to select nominees who have been their colleagues.

Informational hypothesis 3:  Presidents are more likely to select nominees with a record of service as a judge or government official.

Informational hypothesis 4:  Presidents are likely to select nominees who are partisan     activists."

Under the political strategy, she derives eight hypotheses:

"Political hypothesis 1:  Presidents are less likely to name personal acquaintances to the Supreme Court when the Senate is controlled by the opposing party.

Political hypothesis 2:  Presidents are more likely to name judges to the Supreme Court when the Senate is controlled by the opposing party.

Political hypothesis 3:  Presidents are less likely to name public officials to the Supreme Court when the Senate is controlled by the opposing party.

Political hypothesis 4:  Presidents are more likely to moderate their ideological   preferences when the Senate is controlled by the opposing party.

Political hypothesis 5:  Presidents are more likely to select candidates endorsed by         members of Congress.

Political hypothesis 6:  Presidents are unlikely to select nominees who are partisan          activists.

Political hypothesis 7:  Presidents are more likely to select a nominee from a large state whose support the president is seeking to solidify.

Political hypothesis 8:  Presidents are more likely to select a nominee who is young         enough to remain on the Court for a number of years but old enough not to draw      criticism for his or her lack of experience."

Her conclusion is that presidents will follow an informational strategy if at all possible.  However, when facing an opposition Senate, the president will switch to a political strategy, and depending on the strength of the opposition, act more or less strategically.

I found the book and her research and conclusions to be quite interesting.  However, the actual statistical analyses she used are ones I'm not familiar with.  As such, I am not able to verify her conclusions.  But given that, I wouldn't rule out their reasonableness.  The tenor of the book is quite similar to another book on the Court, Crafting Law:  The Collegial Game by Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs, Jr. and Paul J. Wahlbeck.  This book looks at how the justices make their decisions.  If I were guessing (and I am), this is her PhD dissertation rewritten for publication.  And in fact, Paul Wahlbeck was her advisor and mentor.  As such, the writing at times is somewhat dry.  But given all that, the book is still a valuable and interesting contribution to Supreme Court literature.  I easily recommend it to anyone interested in the Court, especially for those interested in the selection, nomination and eventual votes on future justices.